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JUSTICE AND IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TO CONTACT: PARENTAL 
BELIEFS, FACTUAL FOUNDATION AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
Stephen Gilmore, Professor of Family Law, King’s College London.* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This article explores the issue of fact-finding in cases in which one parent, post-separation, is 
implacably opposed to the other parent’s contact with a child. In this context, the notion of 
the “implacably hostile parent” has a significant gender dimension,1 with debate mostly 
focusing on the “implacably hostile mother”, the child’s mother being most often the resident 
parent post-separation. The portrayal of mothers, often by fathers’ rights organisations, as 
commonly selfishly and stubbornly resisting child/parent contact, is highly contested.2  While 
there are certainly instances of such behaviour in case law,3 there is also research evidence 
that in many cases resident parents have genuine and serious concerns about the 
appropriateness of a parent’s contact4 and that the number of cases of unfounded hostility to 
contact is comparatively small.5 There has been concern that the courts’ strong pro-contact 
stance may in some cases downplay the significance of genuine risks to children and resident 
parents,6 and that the issue between the parties is then erroneously reconstructed as the 
mother’s unreasonable and invincible opposition.7  
 Fact-finding is an important component of justice to the parent on either side of such 
disputes. It is essential to ensure, for example, that a mother who has genuine fears is not 
erroneously labelled as unjustifiably hostile to contact; or that a father’s contact is not 
erroneously characterised as harmful in cases of unjustifiable hostility. The role of fact-
finding in ensuring justice is of crucial importance in children cases because, at the stage of 
considering the child’s welfare, the court must treat the child’s welfare as its paramount 
                                                 
*I am grateful to Andrew Bainham, Chris Barton, Gillian Douglas, Mark Henaghan, Jonathan Herring, Naci 
Mehmet, and the anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  Any errors are mine alone.  
1 L. Trinder, “Dangerous Dads and Malicious Mothers: The Relevance of Gender to Contact Disputes” in M. 
Maclean (ed.), Parenting After Partnering – Containing Conflict after Separation (Oxford: Hart, 2007) pp. 81-
94. 
2 R. Collier and S. Sheldon (eds.), Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: 
Hart, 2006) particularly at pp. 64-65, and S. Boyd, “Demonizing Mothers: Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Child 
Custody Law Reform Processes” (2004) 6(1) Journal of the Association for Research on Mothering 52-74. 
3 See, e.g., Re J (A Child - Intractable Contact) [2017] EWFC B103; Re A (Intractable Contact Dispute: Human 
Rights Violations) [2013] EWCA Civ 1104; [2014] 1 F.L.R. 1185; Warwickshire County Council v TE & Others 
[2010] EWHC B19;  Re D (Intractable Contact Dispute: Publicity) [2004] EWHC 727 (Fam); [2004] 1 F.L.R. 
1226.   
4 For an overview of the problem of domestic abuse, e.g., see R. Hunter, A. Barnett and F. Kaganas, “Introduction: 
contact and domestic abuse” (2018) 4 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 401-425. 
5 L. Trinder, A. MacLeod, J. Pearce, and H. Woodward, “Enforcing Child Contact Orders: Are the Family Courts 
Getting it Right?” [2013] Family Law 1145. See per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P. in Re H (a child) (contact: 
mother’s opposition) [2001] 1 F.C.R. 59, at 63: “there is a small but enormously difficult group of cases where 
the mother refuses contact and there are great difficulties firstly over the arrangements and secondly over the 
enforcement of contact.”  
6 R. Bailey-Harris, J. Barron, and J. Pearce, “From utility to rights? The presumption of contact in practice” (1999) 
13(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 111–131; A. Perry and B. Rainey, “Supervised, 
Supported and Indirect Contact Orders: Research Findings” (2007) 21(1) International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family 21–47.   
7 A. Barnett, “Contact at all costs? Domestic violence and children’s welfare” (2014) 26 Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 439–462; H. Rhoades, “The ‘No Contact Mother’: Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era of the 
‘New Father’” (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 71-94.   
 
 
consideration8  and the interests of others cannot at that point be considered independently of 
their impact upon child welfare.   
Yet the opportunities for appellate scrutiny of, and guidance on, fact-finding in 
children cases are limited. In most cases, other than appeals from a fact-finding hearing, an 
appellate court accepts the admissions or facts as found by the judge. The focus is thus often 
merely on scrutinising whether the various matters identified by the judge as bearing upon 
child welfare have been weighed appropriately, as opposed to examining the judge’s 
reasoning which led to findings of fact. A rare opportunity for the Court of Appeal to stress 
the importance of fact-finding in a case in which parents, post-separation, are bitterly 
contesting the non-resident parent’s contact with the child(ren), arose in Re J (children) 
(contact orders: procedure).9 This case was unusual in that the complete failure to make 
findings of fact on the issues between parents attracted the Court of Appeal’s attention. The 
mother made several allegations against the father of violent and aggressive behaviour, 
including “marital rape”, and claimed that the children had been traumatised, for which 
reasons she and the children opposed contact with the father. By contrast the father claimed 
that he was a victim of the mother’s false allegations and unjustified poisoning of the 
children’s minds. By dint of several procedural failings, the judge was faced with a case in 
which, late in its lengthy process, no findings of fact had been made. In the circumstances, 
the judge opined that it was not necessary to make adverse findings against the father since 
he was convinced that the mother’s objection to contact was genuine, based upon the 
children’s trenchant objections to contact, as evidenced by their statements in court 
documents. The Court of Appeal allowed the father’s appeal against the judge’s order 
limiting his contact. As McFarlane L.J. explained: 
 
“In this case, as the court had failed to determine the underlying facts, it was not, in 
reality, in any informed position to decide what of the range of options that might be 
available would best meet the needs of the children. If, taking the father’s case at its 
highest, this mother had cynically and without justification poisoned the minds of her 
children so that they were now so wholly opposed to their father, then leaving them in 
her care with no prospect of future contact to him is unlikely to be in their long-term 
interests. If, on the contrary, the mother’s case on the facts was sound, an order for 
limited or no contact might have been justified given the trenchant views and the ages 
of the children.”10 
 
    As well as underlining the importance of fact-finding, Re J highlights features of child law 
decision-making which are sometimes in tension, particularly in intractable contact cases, and 
which are the focus of this article: on the one hand, the requirement that an inference as to 
risk of harm to a child have a factual foundation; and on the other, the courts’ acceptance that 
a parent’s genuine (yet not necessarily rational) belief may be a relevant factor in so far as it 
bears upon the welfare of the child. The tension between fact and belief is at its starkest when 
a parent’s genuinely held erroneous belief conflicts with the court’s findings of fact relating 
to the belief. A striking example is when a court has found that a father has not sexually 
abused his child, but the child’s mother (still) genuinely believes he has. Yet, because of the 
appellate court’s limited engagement with fact-finding, the issue of the factual underpinning 
of a parent’s belief or attitude, and how tensions between fact and belief and their impact on 
child welfare are to be negotiated in a principled fashion, have remained largely unexplored 
by the courts in England and Wales. Moreover, while in recent years there has been much 
                                                 
8 Children Act 1989, s. 1(1). 
9 [2018] EWCA Civ 115; [2018] 2 F.L.R. 998. 
10 Re J (children) (contact orders: procedure) [2018] 2 F.L.R. 998 at [92].  
 
 
emphasis procedurally on fact-finding in cases of alleged domestic abuse,11 albeit not without 
difficulties in practice,12 little attention (if any) has been paid to the need for careful fact- 
finding in relation to parental belief or attitude as a justification for denying child/parent 
contact. With the much broader and abstract canvas available to the academic observer, 
however, this article explores how rules relating to the drawing of inferences as to risk of 
harm to a child should apply in cases in which parental belief or implacable hostility to 
contact is claimed as a justification for denying or restricting the other parent’s contact with a 
child.13  
    The article begins by outlining the English courts’ approach to cases involving  
parental hostility to contact; and explaining the courts’ approach to fact-finding and drawing  
of inferences as to risk of harm to a child in private law children cases. It then sets out the 
reasoning in the few cases which have engaged with the latter issue in the context of 
parent/child contact and demonstrates that the cases are not easy to navigate and to reconcile.  
The article therefore analyses the various types of case in which parental hostility might arise 
and examines how the requirement that there be a factual foundation for an inference of risk 
of harm applies in such instances.  The analysis highlights the difficulties that may be 
encountered in establishing such factual foundation in some cases and criticises how the 
courts characterise cases in which hostility is not justified. 
  
 
II.  Parental Hostility To Contact: The Courts’ Approach 
 
It was accepted in Re B (A Minor) (Access)14 and is now considered “well settled”15 that a 
parent’s attitude to contact (termed by Latey J. “implacable hostility”16) can constitute an 
exception to the courts’ general principle that a child should grow up in the knowledge of 
both parents, where “to enforce, impose or seek to enforce or seek to impose access is going 
to have adverse effects on the child and injure it”.17 It has been acknowledged, therefore, that 
in some cases “the welfare of the child requires the court to inflict injustice upon a parent 
with whom the child is not resident”.18  
 In Re D (A Minor) (Contact: Mother’s Hostility),19 Waite L.J. held that a judge had 
not fallen into error in denying a father contact with his child where the mother’s attitude 
towards contact placed a child at “serious risk of major emotional harm if she were to be 
                                                 
11 Family Procedure Rules 2010, Practice Direction 12J. 
12 A. Barnett, “‘Like gold dust these days’: Domestic violence fact-finding hearings in child contact cases” (2015) 
23 Feminist Legal Studies 47–78. 
13 The problem is not unique to English law. For the Australian approach to implacable hostility, see Russell and 
Close (unreported, Full Court of the Family Court, 25 June 1993), as approved in A v A [1998] FamCA 25; 146 
F.L.R. 188.   On fact-finding and risk, see M v M [1988] H.C.A. 68; (1988) 166 C.L.R. 69 and for critique P. 
Parkinson, “Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in the Family Court” (1990) 4 Australian Journal of Family Law 60  
and L. Young, S. Dhillon and L. Groves, “Child sexual abuse allegations and s 60CC(2A): A new era?” (2014) 
28 Australian Journal of Family Law 233.  For New Zealand case law examples  see CSM v DRM [2012] N.Z.F.C. 
10117; GEH v AJH [2013] N.Z.F.C. 889; M v H [1999] N.Z.F.L.R. 439; SPB v SLB [Contact] [2010] N.Z.F.L.R. 
958.  For Canadian cases see N. Bala,  S. Hunt and C. McCarney, “Parental Alienation: Canadian Court Cases 
1989–2008” (2010) 48(1) Family Court Review 164-179; N. Bala and K. Hunter, Children Resisting Contact & 
Parental Alienation: Context, Challenges & Recent Ontario Cases (Queen’s University, Canada, Research Paper, 
May 2015). 
14 [1984] F.L.R. 648, CA. 
15 Re D (A Minor) (Contact: Mother’s Hostility) [1993] 2 F.L.R. 1, CA, at 7; [1993] 1 F.C.R. 964, at 972. 
16 Re B (A Minor) (Access) [1984] F.L.R. 648 at 649. 
17 [1984] F.L.R. 648 at 649, and for a similar view Re BC (A Minor) (Access) [1985] F.L.R. 639, CA. 
18 Re J (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 1 F.L.R. 729, CA at 736. 
19 [1993] 2 F.L.R. 1. 
 
 
compelled to accept a degree of contact to the natural father against her will.”20 Drawing 
attention to the words “serious risk of major emotional harm”, Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in 
Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) opined that when judging whether contact will 
injure a child the court should “take a medium-term and long-term view of the child’s 
development and not accord excessive weight to what appear likely to be short-term or 
transient problems.”21 In a review of the authorities in Re D (Contact: Reasons for Refusal),22 
Hale J. (sitting in the Court of Appeal) translated Waite L.J.’s description of the judge’s 
finding in Re D (A Minor) (Contact: Mother’s Hostility) into a prescription, holding that “the 
court will be very slow indeed to reach the conclusion that contact will be harmful to the 
child. It may eventually have to reach that conclusion but it will want to be satisfied that there 
is indeed a serious risk of major emotional harm before doing so.”23 Her ladyship was clear 
that she was here referring to cases in which “no good reason can be discerned either for the 
hostility or for the opposition to contact”24 (hereafter cases of  unfounded or unjustified 
hostility).  Hale J pointed out that it is rather different “where the judge or the court finds that 
the mother’s fears, not only for herself but also for the child, are genuine and rationally 
held”.25 The courts have also subsequently acknowledged a difference where the parent’s 
fears are genuine but not rationally held.26 As Wilson J. observed in Re P (Contact: 
Discretion),27 where a parent advances grounds for hostility to contact “which the court 
regards as sufficiently potent to displace the presumption that contact is in the child's 
interests” the “hostility as such becomes largely irrelevant: what are relevant are its 
underlying grounds, which the court adopts.” Wilson J. noted a third situation in which the 
parent “advances sound arguments for the displacement of the presumption but where there 
are also sound arguments which run the other way”. In such a situation, the “hostility to 
contact can of itself be of importance, occasionally of determinative importance, provided, as 
always, that what is measured is its effect upon the child.” In each case the impact on the 
child of the resident parent’s implacable hostility will need to be weighed against the medium 
or long-term benefits to the child of contact with the non-resident parent. The conclusion may 
not always be that the child’s overall welfare will not be promoted by contact,28 but in some 
cases the impact of the hostility may be determinative.29  
 The courts have been clear, however, that hostility should never of itself be a reason 
for not ordering contact and it would be an abdication of judicial responsibility to decline to 
make a child arrangements order for contact simply on the basis that a parent would not obey 
it.30 As Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. put it in Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions),31 
neither parent “should be encouraged or permitted to think that the more intransigent, the 
                                                 
20 [1993] 2 F.L.R. 1. 
21 [1995] 2 F.L.R. 124, CA; [1995] Fam. Law 541. For comment, see S. Jolly, “Implacable Hostility, Contact, and 
the Limits of Law” (1995) 7 Child and Family Law Quarterly 228. 
22 [1997] 2 F.L.R. 48, CA; [1998] 1 F.C.R. 321. 
23 Re D (Contact: Reasons for Refusal) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 48 at 53. This narrowed the scope of implacable hostility 
from simply injury to the child’s welfare, as set out in the earlier case law.    
24 [1997] 2 F.L.R. 48 at 53. See also Re B (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 1088, at [10]: defining implacable hostility 
as involving an objection to contact which is usually irrational and for poor motives. 
25 Re D (Contact: Reasons for Refusal) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 48 at 53.  For similar categorisation, see Wilson J in Re P 
(Contact: Discretion) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 696; [1999] 1 F.C.R. 566; and for examples, see Re K (Contact: Mother’s 
Anxiety) [1999] 2 F.L.R. 703; [1999] Fam. Law 527; Re J (Refusal of Contact) [2012] EWCA Civ 720, [2013] 2 
F.L.R. 1042. 
26 See e.g., Re L (Contact: Genuine Fear) [2002] 1 F.L.R. 621 at [42]. 
27 [1998] 2 F.L.R. 696 at 703-704. 
28 See e.g., Re E (A Minor: Access) [1987] 1 F.L.R. 368; [1987] Fam. Law 90. 
29 See e.g., Re J (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 1 F.L.R. 729; [1994] 2 F.C.R. 741. 
30 Re W (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 441; [1994] 2 F.C.R. 1216. 
31 [1995] 2 F.L.R. 124. 
 
 
more unreasonable, the more obdurate and more unco-operative they are, the more likely they 
are to get their own way.”32 The courts thus view hostility to contact as “a very unattractive 
argument to place before a court”.33 They will also not “presume problems between parents 
over contact unless and until they become apparent”.34 As implied by this dictum and Hale 
J.’s reference to the court needing to be satisfied of harm to the child, there must be more 
than mere speculation about the impact of hostility on the child’s welfare; rather there must 
be some evidence of the parental hostility and that it is likely to result in major emotional 
harm if contact be ordered.   
    These implacable hostility cases are, like all other children cases, subject to the courts’ 
general approach to proof of facts and the drawing of inferences as to harm therefrom. This 
approach is outlined in the next section and followed by an account of the very few appellate 
cases which have so far engaged with issues of fact-finding in cases in which parents’ beliefs 
concerning contact are in conflict.   
 
III.  Factual Underpinning of an Inference as To Risk of Harm 
 
“Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else” (Charles 
Dickens, Hard Times, 1854) 
 
Whenever a court is considering an application for a child arrangements order under s. 8 of 
the Children Act 1989, it must apply the child’s welfare as its paramount consideration35 and, 
in any contested application, must have regard in particular to matters set out in a checklist in 
s. 1(3).36  In Re M and R (minors) (sexual abuse: expert evidence)37 the Court of Appeal was 
concerned with the interpretation of s. 1(3)(e), which enjoins the court to consider “any harm 
which [the child] has suffered or is at risk of suffering”. Drawing on the House of Lords’ 
interpretation of the requirements for proof of “likely harm” within the meaning of s. 31(2) of 
the Children Act 1989 in In re H and others (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof),38 
the Court concluded that risk of harm within s. 1(3)(e) means a real possibility of future 
harm,39 and that such risk must be founded upon facts proved to the court’s satisfaction on 
the balance of probabilities as opposed to on the basis of suspicion(s)40 (hereafter “the rule in 
Re M and R”). The Court could find nothing in the Children Act 1989 to suggest that 
Parliament intended that all-important decisions as to a child’s future should be decided on 
the basis of suspicion which “would be a recipe for making decisions which were not in the 
best interests of the child.”41 Nor could the Court find any suggestion that Parliament 
intended to create a fundamental difference between public and private law cases, 
commenting: 
 
                                                 
32 [1995] 2 F.L.R. 124 at 129-130. 
33 Re H (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 776 at 783; [1994] 2 F.C.R. 419 at 427. 
34 [1994] 2 F.L.R. 776 at 782. 
35 Children Act 1989, s. 1(1). 
36 Children Act 1989, s. 1(4). 
37 [1996] 4 All E.R. 239; [1996] 2 F.L.R. 195. 
38 [1996] A.C. 563; [1996] 1 All E.R. 1.  
39 Re M and R (minors) (sexual abuse: expert evidence) [1996] 4 All E.R. 239 at 248.  
40  The approach adopted in In re H is not uncontroversial. For comment, see M. Hayes, “Reconciling Protection 
for Children with Justice for Parents” (1997) 17 Legal Studies 1; C. Keenan, “Finding that a Child is at Risk from 
Sexual Abuse: Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof” (1997) 60 M.L.R. 857; H. Keating, “Shifting 
Standards in the House of Lords—Re H and Others (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof)” (1996) 8 Child 
and Family Law Quarterly 157. 
41 Re M and R (minors) (sexual abuse: expert evidence) [1996] 4 All E.R. 239 at 247. 
 
 
“for whereas the local authority would have to surmount the threshold stage by 
proving matters on a preponderance of probabilities, one parent seeking, for example, 
permanently to exclude the other parent from any relationship, such as contact, with 
the child, would only have to establish possibilities rather than probabilities.”42 
 
    In In re H, the House of Lords’ opinion on which this Court of Appeal decision was based, 
was an unusual case on its facts in that the alleged likely harm to the children was premised 
solely upon whether an older sibling had been sexually abused in the past. There is, however, 
no general requirement of proof of past harm in order for an inference as to risk of future 
harm to be made. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead observed in In re H: 
 
“There will be cases where, although the alleged maltreatment itself is not proved, the 
evidence does establish a combination of profoundly worrying features affecting the 
care of the child within the family. In such cases it would be open to a court in 
appropriate circumstances to find that, although not satisfied the child is yet suffering 
significant harm, on the basis of such facts as are proved there is a likelihood that he 
will do so in the future.”43  
 
    The reasoning in In Re H has been endorsed by the House of Lords/Supreme Court on 
several occasions,44 and in Re O and N (minors); re B (minors)45 the House of Lords, while 
not deciding the point, which had not been fully argued, found “attractive the conclusions of 
the Court of Appeal in re M and R”, being of the view that it “would be odd if, on this point, 
the approach in proceedings for a s 8 order were different from the approach in care 
proceedings.”46 It is clear, therefore, that in a contested application for a child arrangements 
order under s. 8 of the Children Act 1989 any future risk of harm to a child in the sense of a 
real possibility of harm must be underpinned by facts from which such an inference can be 
drawn.   
    As to the proof of such facts, the burden is on the party asserting them, which in a civil 
case must be established on the balance of probabilities, that is by proving a fact to be more 
probably true than not.47 There is no room for a court to conclude that something might have 
happened or might be the case. If a tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by 
concluding that the person who had the burden of proof has failed to discharge it.48 The law 
operates a binary system, the effect of which is that an alleged fact not proved is not a fact.49  
However, the failure to find a fact proved on the balance of probabilities does not equate 
without more to a finding that an allegation is false.  In Re M (Children)50  a father was 
resisting an allegation that he forced his son to watch Jihadist DVDs in order to radicalize 
him. The judge found the allegation not proved. However, the father wished the judge to go 
further and declare the allegation to be false, to enable him to cast doubt on the mother’s 
                                                 
42 [1996] 4 All E.R. 239 at 247.  For criticism of the extension of the approach in In re H to s. 1(3)(e) to private 
law cases, see I. Hemingway and C. Williams, “Re M and R; Re H and R” [1997] Fam. Law 740. 
43 In re H [1996] A.C. 563 at 591-592. 
44 Re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (Cafcass Intervening) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] A.C. 
11; obiter in Re S-B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof), [2009] UKSC 178, [2010] 1 A.C. 678; Re 
J (Care Proceedings: Possible Perpetrators) [2013] UKSC 9, [2013] 1 A.C. 680. 
45 [2003] UKHL 18; [2004] 1 A.C. 523. 
46 [2004] 1 A.C. 523 at [45], per Lord Nicholls, who had delivered the leading opinion in In re H. 
47 For a useful summary of established principles, see Re E (Female Genital Mutilation and Permission to Remove) 
[2016] EWHC 1052; [2017] 1 F.L.R. 1255 at [57]. 
48 Subject also to any presumption. 
49 See per Lord Hoffmann in Re B [2009] A.C. 11 at [2]. 
50 [2013] EWCA Civ 388, CA. 
 
 
credibility on other matters.  The Court of Appeal commented that “if a negative is to be 
proved, that has to be proved with cogent evidence, just as if the positive is to be proved.  It is 
not a correct proposition of law that a rejection of evidence mandates a judge to find that 
something is false; that is misconceived.”51 The significance for the present analysis of this 
difference between the failure to prove a positive and the proof of a negative will become 
apparent later. 
 In Re A (A Child),52 Sir James Munby P. drew attention to some fundamental points 
concerning fact-finding which he feared were too often overlooked in child care cases (but 
which, it is submitted, are equally applicable to private law cases). First, his lordship 
highlighted the important difference “between an assertion of fact and the evidence needed to 
prove the assertion”53 and that it is the latter which is required to factually ground a case; and 
secondly, the need to demonstrate why the facts justify the conclusion that the child has 
suffered, or is at risk of suffering harm.54 A reminder of these points seems particularly 
pertinent in cases in which there may be assertions that a parental attitude risks harm to a 
child if contact is ordered. Moreover, while the same approach to fact finding applies to both 
private law and public law cases, Baroness Hale of Richmond cautioned in Re B (Children) 
(Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (Cafcass Intervening)55 that in a private law case: 
 
“There are specific risks to which the court must be alive.  Allegations of abuse are 
not being made by a neutral and expert local authority which has nothing to gain by 
making them, but by a parent who is seeking to gain an advantage in the battle against 
the other parent. This does not mean that they are false, but it does increase the risk of 
misinterpretation, exaggeration or downright fabrication.”56 
 
With this outline of general principles, attention now turns to fact-finding in the case law on 
contact. 
 
IV.  Fact-finding and Inferences as to Risk of Harm in the Case Law on 
Contact 
  
Few authorities engage with the issue of factual underpinning of a risk of harm in private law 
contact cases, and those which do exist are hard to reconcile.   In Re H (A Minor)57 the Court 
of Appeal (citing Re M and R (minors) (sexual abuse: expert evidence)58) confirmed that “the 
assessment of a given risk to a child in private law proceedings must be based on findings of 
fact” proved on the balance of probabilities. In Re H a judge had ordered supervised contact 
on the basis of a mother’s genuine fear that the father would remove the child from the 
jurisdiction. This had caused the mother “a great deal of distress and unhappiness”, which 
had been communicated to the child. The mother alleged that during a dispute about the 
child’s late return from a contact visit, the father had said to her “I will make sure you don’t 
see her again” (referring to the daughter). However, this incident had never been the subject 
of any judicial finding of fact. The Court of Appeal held that the critical issue was the risk of 
abduction, and the judge had erred in failing to assess whether the mother’s fears about 
                                                 
51 [2013] EWCA Civ 388 at [17]. 
52 [2015] EWFC 11; [2016] 1 F.L.R. 1. 
53 Re A (A Child) [2016] 1 F.L.R. 1 at [10]. 
54 [2016] 1 F.L.R. 1 at [12]. 
55 [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] A.C. 11. 
56 [2009] A.C. 11 at [29]. 
57 Transcript CA, 29 January 1998 (unreported). 
58 [1996] 4 All E.R. 239.   
 
 
unsupervised contact were justified.  In so concluding, the Court was clear that the trial judge 
was plainly wrong when he stated that the test was not whether or not the appellant intended 
to abduct the child but whether or not the respondent believed that such a threat existed. It 
was incumbent upon the judge to assess the risk of abduction in order to assess whether the 
respondent’s fears about unsupervised contact were justified.59 In addition, the court held that 
the judge was plainly wrong when he failed to make any findings of fact as to whether the 
appellant threatened to abduct the child and/or failed to assess the risk of such abduction.  
While disagreeing with the judge’s reasoning, the court left the order in place,60 but also 
made a family assistance order61 in the hope that the parties might resolve the tensions 
between them, and with the possibility that the father could apply to the court to vary the 
order, if need be.    
    In Re M (Contact: Family Assistance: McKenzie Friend),62 in a contact dispute between 
parents, there was “an issue as to whether or not, as the mother contended, the father had 
treated her with violence.” Without any reference to Re M and R, Ward L.J. commented that 
it is “unnecessary to speculate further on that aspect.  It is sufficient to note that the judge was 
satisfied that the mother’s fears were genuinely held.”63  His Lordship added a comment to 
the father that “whether he likes it or not, and even whether he deserves it or not, the fact is 
that the mother is fearful of his part in the children’s life...” (emphasis added).  It is not at all 
clear from the report of this case whether the judge’s finding as to the mother’s fears were 
associated with a finding of fact of the father’s violence, or indeed whether such findings 
were ever made. Ward L.J.’s comments above are at least suggestive that the judge’s focus 
may only have been on the mother’s claimed anxieties.  Certainly, however, the Court of 
Appeal, in upholding the judge’s decision to deny direct contact and make an order for 
indirect contact only, saw the crucial issue as “the capacity of the mother to be able to cope 
with the contact taking place in such a way as does not have her anxiety spill over to affect 
adversely the behaviour of her children.”64    
    Applying this approach, it has been held that contact may be restricted by reason of a 
mother’s fears, even where findings of fact have excluded the father as a risk.65 In Re A (A 
Child) (Contact: Sexual Abuse)66 the Court of Appeal ordered supervised contact to allay a 
mother’s fears despite a judge’s conclusion that alleged sexual abuse of the child had not 
been perpetrated by the father. In that case the mother appealed a judge’s decisions to grant 
the father visiting contact with his six-year-old daughter at a contact centre, and that a report 
be prepared on how future contact could be extended to include staying contact. The parents 
had both been sexually abused during childhood and the mother, a social worker who had 
worked in child protection, found it difficult to trust the father to play an ordinary fathering 
role for the reasons given below.  When the child was three months old the mother expressed 
concern that the father had sung to his daughter a popular song with lyrics that the mother 
perceived as inappropriate: “You’re too sexy for your clothes”. When the child was aged 10 
or 11 months the mother observed her playing with her nipples (which presumably the 
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61 Children Act 1989, s. 16. 
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mother perceived as sexualized behaviour).   Because of the mother’s suspicions, the father 
withdrew from dressing, bathing and toileting the child when she was about nine months old. 
    When the girl was about five years old the mother returned home to find her in tights but 
without knickers. The mother claimed that the girl had said that the father would not allow 
her to put her knickers on and was touching her bottom. The girl told the mother on other 
occasions that the father had manipulated her nipples and had touched her private parts. The 
mother changed the locks of the property and did not permit the father back into the 
matrimonial home. The father did not deny that the child had said these things, but he 
strongly denied the allegations of abuse. He was sensitive to how the mother felt and it was 
agreed that contact should take place with the mother present. This continued for two months 
until all contact ceased following an argument between the parties about removal of the 
father’s property from the former matrimonial home.   
    The mother reported the allegations to the police and to social services. An interview 
carried out in accordance with the Memorandum of Good Practice67 elicited nothing in the 
way of an allegation of sexual abuse and no further action was taken. The father applied for 
contact. A welfare report under s. 7 of the Children Act 1989 recommended supervised 
contact, recognising the reality of the mother’s beliefs, the child’s fondness for the father and 
wish to see him, and that the child had been exposed to an environment highly sensitive to 
sexual abuse. The evidence also noted that the girl had had ‘experiences at nursery school 
that were novel to her.’ The case report does not explain what these were, but one assumes 
they were experiences which might have some bearing on what the child was saying. After a 
three-day hearing, the judge said that this was not a case where he simply could not be 
satisfied that sexual abuse had taken place; he made a positive finding that it had not.   
    On the mother’s appeal, the Court of Appeal substituted an order for supervised contact 
and indicated that any proposed investigation of the possibility of staying contact was 
premature. Hale L.J., delivering the leading judgment, with which Mance L.J. agreed, was  
clear that there was a need for supervised contact for three reasons: (1) the priority in the case 
was to get some sort of contact going again, and the judge and the section 7 report 
acknowledged a need to tread with care in making the re-introduction; (2) the fact that a child 
aged 5 had said these things required caution; and (3) “contact is unlikely to work or be 
enjoyable for the child or for the father unless the mother feels less anxious about it.”68 Hale 
L.J. explained: 
 
“This is a situation in which it is entirely possible for both parties to be right, in the 
sense that the father did not behave inappropriately with his daughter but the mother 
retains a real belief that he did based on what her daughter has said. In an ideal world 
the mother should be prepared to accept the findings of the judge and go along with 
them. But I recognise that that is often a very difficult thing to do. It leaves out of 
account all sorts of other factors which will make it difficult for her to do so, above 
all, her strongly protective view towards her child. It is for those reasons that I accept 
that there is a need, for the time being, for contact between the father and the child to 
be supervised in the sense in which I have described it.”69 
 
    As can be seen, the cases do not sit easily together.  Re H (A minor) correctly requires 
findings as to whether there is a risk of abduction, but then seems to conclude that the 
mother’s belief must be justified, in the sense of aligning with a finding of risk, i.e., a finding 
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that the father intends to abduct the child. The court does not seem to acknowledge that the 
mother could hold a genuine fear irrespective of whether there is a risk of abduction (based 
for example simply on what the father said). By contrast the reasoning in Re M (Contact: 
Family Assistance: McKenzie Friend) is at the other extreme, suggesting that no fact-finding 
as to risk of domestic violence is necessary provided the mother’s fear of contact is genuine.  
At the very least the Court of Appeal in that case is guilty of not making clear the underlying 
factual basis of the mother’s fear. If the mother’s fears were based on the alleged history of 
domestic abuse (as seems likely), a finding of fact on that is required because, as Wilson J. 
observed in Re P (Contact: Discretion), if true the mother’s fear is “irrelevant: what are 
relevant are its underlying grounds, which the court adopts”;70 and if the allegations of 
domestic abuse are not true, that finding casts doubt on the factual foundation for the 
mother’s fear, and thus its genuineness. Re A (A Child) (Contact: Sexual Abuse) does not sit 
well with either of the two cases discussed above, in its continued reliance on the mother’s 
beliefs which are premised on allegations against the father which had been shown not to be 
true. In so far as that approach implicates the father as a risk to the child, it is not at all easy 
to square with the Supreme Court’s requirement in the context of “possible perpetrator 
cases”, applying the House of Lords’ reasoning in In re H, that a finding of risk of harm from 
a parent requires both harm, and identification of the perpetrator of harm, be underpinned by 
fact.71  
 
V.  Factual Underpinning in Hostility Cases – An Analysis 
 
Given the difficulties of reconciling the existing case law on the factual underpinning of 
objections to contact, the rest of this article is concerned to analyse the various situations in 
which hostility to contact occurs, and to identify the factual foundation for inferences as to 
risk of harm to a child in such cases. The case law falls into at least three different types.  
 
1.  Finding(s) of fact as to past harm (or other worrying facts) with a conclusion that there is a 
risk of future harm. A classic example is the parent who has been violent and continues to 
represent a risk of violence to the other parent and/or child. In such a case there is a factual 
basis for an inference of risk, independent of parental attitude/belief. 
 
2.  Finding(s) of fact as to past harm (or other worrying facts) with a finding that there is no 
on-going risk of such harm, but with a genuine (actual) fear of contact (whether rational or 
not), which means that the effect on the resident parent of ordering contact will in turn impact 
negatively on the child’s welfare. In this type of case there may have been, for example, 
severe violence in the past by a perpetrator who is reformed, but nonetheless an ongoing fear 
of such violence rationally held in light of past events. Cases in which there is a finding of 
past harm and that a parent’s fear is genuine but not rationally held are rare, and there is 
clearly room for disagreement as to the lack of rationality of the resident parent’s fears in 
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such cases.72 In either case, however, there is a factual foundation for the fear, based on the 
past harm or other worrying past findings of fact. 
 
3.  No finding of fact as to alleged harm or other alleged worrying features of a case or, even 
stronger, a finding that there has been no such alleged behaviour, but nonetheless an ongoing 
claim of risk of harm to a child from a parent’s attitude to contact if ordered.  
 
In each of the first two categories above, it is not difficult to identify at least some factual 
finding capable of supporting the parent’s attitude or belief in relation to contact, which 
makes the parent’s hostility understandable to some extent. The third category  is more 
problematic. Into this last category falls a range of objections to a parent’s contact, including 
the entirely baseless objection,73 the irrational conclusion based on fact, 74  and the genuine 
and rational concern based upon disputed allegations or a factual error. 75 In the following 
discussion it will be argued that in every case, irrespective of the nature of the objection, the 
court’s first task is to ascertain whether the rule in Re M and R is fulfilled with respect to the 
claimed risk of harm to the child. It will be suggested, however, that the nature of the parent’s 
objection may well go to the ease or difficulty of establishing a factual foundation for the 
risk. It will also be argued that, in cases involving disputed facts, whether a factual 
foundation for a parental belief can be established may depend on the court’s precise findings 
of fact. The court’s second task, in any case in which the Re M and R rule is fulfilled, is then 
to consider whether the parent’s attitude or belief represents a justifiable objection to contact.  
 
1.  Parental attitude to contact and the rule in Re M and R: establishing a 
factual foundation for risk 
 
As we have seen, if it is to be said that there is a risk of emotional harm to a child from a 
parental belief or attitude, the risk cannot be underpinned simply by an assertion or suspicion 
of the belief or attitude,76 in the same way that a court may not rely on assertions or 
suspicions to prove risks of domestic abuse or child abuse.  The law requires a chain of 
inference based on fact before the inference as to risk of harm can properly be made. There 
must therefore be facts proved on the balance of probabilities from which the conclusion can 
be drawn that a parent actually holds a particular belief or attitude, from which in turn an 
inference can be made that the nature of that attitude would represent a serious risk of major 
emotional harm to the child if contact were ordered.   
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Re L (Contact: Genuine Fear) [2002] 1 F.L.R. 621 at [42] (mother with phobia of a father who had a 
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Withdraw) [2017] EWHC 3741 (Fam), [2018] 2 F.L.R. 1121 (proceedings withdrawn where allegation that 
children had been radicalised was based on speculation rather than factual foundation). 
 
 
    That is not, of course, to say that a parent’s belief must be shown to be true or justified. 
There is an important difference between the truth of a belief and whether it is actually held.  
The court is concerned only with the latter and clearly therefore an erroneous belief can be 
proved to exist.  However, while it is important not to equate sincerity with truth or 
justification, the reasonableness or otherwise of the belief may legitimately be a matter of 
evidence capable of going to a finding as to whether the belief is actually held; that is, the 
fact that a belief is baseless in the circumstances could be a basis for a court’s inference that 
the belief has not been proved to its satisfaction to exist.77 As the Full Court of the Family 
Court of Australia commented in Blinko v Blinko:78   
 
“If the Court does not find that a parent represents such an unacceptable risk of harm, 
nonetheless it may take into account anxiety on the part of the other parent arising 
from their genuine, but not necessarily rational, belief that the parent represents such a 
risk of harm. In such a case, the other parent’s belief must be genuinely held. If it is 
entirely irrational and baseless, then the genuineness of the belief would clearly be 
open to doubt.”79 
 
    It follows that in a case of unfounded hostility to contact, in which there has been no post-
separation contact (and therefore the resident parent’s reaction to it, and its impact upon the 
child, cannot be known) a court may face considerable difficulty identifying facts from which 
it can infer that a parent holds an implacable hostility to contact which is of such intensity 
that it risks harm to the child if contact be ordered.  It is likely to be difficult, in a case of 
baseless or irrational opposition, to adduce evidence independent of the belief-holder’s mere 
assertion, or evidence which is not self-serving, that is capable of demonstrating on the 
balance of probabilities the existence of such a belief or attitude capable of being a major risk 
of emotional harm to the child.  Even in a case in which hostility is proved by reference to the 
facts, it may be difficult to infer the requisite level of risk. Take for example a mother who 
“hates” her child’s father and is implacably opposed to contact because he had an extra-
marital relationship which led to the relationship breakdown. Apart from the extra-marital 
affair, however, he is an unimpeachable parent and former husband. While there may be 
some factual foundation for her hostility, it may be difficult for the mother, by reference to 
those facts alone, to establish on the balance of probabilities that her attitude to contact places 
the child at serious risk of major emotional harm if contact were ordered, since her hostility 
to the father does not necessarily evidence that her reaction to contact, if ordered, would be 
such as to cause major emotional harm. 
    To be clear, the discussion here is not concerned with a parent’s behaviour post the making 
of an order, when an attitude may well translate into defiance of, or emotional reaction to, the 
order, with a discernible knock-on effect on the child, which then may evidence the attitude 
concerned and its impact on the child’s welfare. The focus here is on the initial stage of 
deciding whether in principle contact should be ordered. At that stage in a case of unfounded 
hostility to contact, proving by reference to facts proved on the balance of probabilities that a 
parent’s attitude exists and presents a serious risk of major emotional harm to the child, may 
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not be easy. Courts should clearly articulate the facts on which they draw such conclusions, 
in the absence of which there can be no opposition to contact based upon risk to a child from 
a parent’s implacable hostility. 
 
2.  Cases in which parental belief is in conflict with the court’s findings of fact 
 
Cases which are likely to require a particularly careful analysis of whether the Re M and R 
rule is fulfilled, are those in which any alleged factual foundation for a parent’s belief 
conflicts with the court’s finding(s) of fact. Here are some, admittedly extreme, examples.  
Imagine a mother who has a belief that the father is possessed by evil spirits and might pass 
on this evil to the child through contact. The father is thus perceived by the mother to be a 
danger to her and the child, and her attitude to contact places the stability of the mother/child 
relationship in danger if contact is ordered, with a potentially negative effect on the child’s 
welfare. Within some cultures this example is not so far-fetched. Is the court to proceed on 
the basis of this genuine (actual) false belief, against the court’s inability to find as a matter 
of fact that the father is so possessed? Indeed, it seems likely that in such a case the court’s 
finding would be even more positively in favour of the father, i.e., a negative finding that he 
is not possessed.   
    By way of a similar example, albeit one in which the facts may be more susceptible to 
objective determination, imagine that the mother believes erroneously that the father has 
contracted an infectious disease on a recent trip abroad which he will pass on to the mother 
and child during contact. Despite medical evidence supporting a finding of fact by the court 
that the father is not infected, the mother genuinely holds to her fears. Again, her reaction to 
contact if ordered is likely to destabilise the family and impact negatively on the child’s 
welfare. Is the court to proceed on the basis of the mother’s erroneous belief in its impact 
upon the child, in the face of objective reality? The writer’s intuition is to think that many 
readers would think it bizarre for the law to act in the face of reality in favour of such clearly 
erroneous views in denying a father contact with his child. Perhaps the reason is that these are 
cases in which on their facts the courts are able with some conviction to hold that the alleged 
facts are not only not proved, but do not exist at all. In other words, the court is able to say 
strongly that the allegations are false.   
    These scenarios have been chosen for their clarity, unencumbered as some cases are by 
less certainty and more complex and difficult facts. However, while these scenarios provide 
clear illustrations, in relation to court fact-finding they are no different from any other case in 
which a belief is found to be erroneous by reference to the court’s finding that something has 
not happened or does not exist. As we have seen, such cases can arise in the context of 
allegations of sexual abuse where suspicion is not always easily alleviated by findings of fact 
on the balance of probabilities. But even in the greater uncertainty of the arena of sexual 
abuse allegations, in the context of the required binary certainty required of court fact-
finding, a case such as Re A (A Child) (Contact: Sexual Abuse),80 discussed earlier, is in 
principle the same as the scenarios mentioned above. How in principle is such a conflict 
between fact-finding and parental belief to be resolved?   
 While the law permits reliance upon a mistaken belief in certain circumstances,81 it is  
difficult to think of cases in which the law permits reliance on alleged facts to found a 
mistaken belief prospectively, after the mistake as to the existence of the facts (and thus the 
mistaken belief) has been determined by a court to be so and brought to the belief-holder’s 
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attention. The issue has been touched upon in other contexts in family law. In Synge v 
Synge82 Sir Frances Jeune P. held that a wife’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with her 
husband constituted a reasonable defence to the husband’s alleged desertion of the wife 
within the meaning of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. The wife contended that her reason 
for refusing marital rights to the husband was that he was infected with syphilis and 
intercourse was therefore unsafe and improper. However, it was proved after a doctor’s 
examination that the husband did not have syphilis. The wife continued, however, to contend 
that she had believed bona fide that the husband was infected and that her belief justified her 
refusal of intercourse and destroyed the husband’s ground of desertion. The President 
rejected this contention, commenting: 
 
 “…when the fact can be and, as in this case, has been ascertained, why should the 
mistaken belief of the wife, even if honest, prevail over the well-founded and equally 
honest belief of the husband? The primary question to be decided is: Had the husband 
reasonable ground for desertion? If belief is to be taken into consideration, why 
should not his honest belief that his wife refused him marital rights without cause 
justify his conduct even though the wife honestly believed that she had good grounds 
for such refusal? The solution of the problem presented by such a conflict of beliefs 
is, I think, to be found in holding that, where the fact can be determined, the fact must 
prevail, and that erroneous beliefs on either side are immaterial.”83 
  
    In Everitt v Everitt,84 Lord Merriman P. applied this dictum and, importantly, commented 
that the words of the last sentence above are of general application.85 In Allen v Allen,86 
another divorce case, it was held that even a reasonable but erroneous belief of a fact is 
extinguished (at least prospectively) upon a finding that the fact cannot be established. Sir 
Raymond Evershed M.R. commented that otherwise “the position would be that a husband 
could successfully persist in refusing to discharge the obligations which lie on him as a 
husband by continuing to assert an honest and reasonable belief (in the sense of its being a 
belief that is sensible and not the result of caprice or stubborn and distorted judgment) in the 
proposition that his wife is an adulteress, a proposition which he has been, and continues to 
be, quite unable to prove in a court of law.”87  
    On the strength of the authorities discussed above, any factual foundation for a parent’s 
belief is extinguished, at least prospectively, by the court’s complete negation of that factual 
foundation by its findings of fact to the contrary. As Lord Merriman P. observed, that is a 
principle of general application and there does not appear to be any reason not to apply it to 
children cases simply because, as it might be said, those cases involve the welfare of a child 
and are therefore different. We are here considering the earlier stage of identifying the facts 
from which the court should proceed to consider the issue of the child’s welfare.88 There is no 
justifiable difference in principle at the fact-finding stage. It must follow that in a case like Re 
A discussed above, in which there are competing parental beliefs as to whether the father has 
sexually abused the child, one supported by the court’s finding of fact and the other not, the 
solution, as Sir Frances Jeune P. observed, must be to resolve the competing views by 
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reference to determined fact, which must prevail, any erroneous beliefs on either side being 
immaterial. That approach, however, does not sit easily, or at all, with some of the reasoning 
in Re A.   
    One senses that, while the court in Re A acknowledged that the judge was entitled to make 
the finding he had, it remained uneasy with the degree of certainty with which the judge 
approached his findings on the allegations, given the acceptance by the father that the child’s 
allegations had been uttered. Otherwise, why would the Court of Appeal have felt it 
necessary to mention the child’s allegations remained a matter of concern in the proceedings?  
One can of course have some sympathy with that unease. As Thorpe L.J. observed on the 
permission to appeal hearing in the case, if no abuse had taken place, why, as the father did 
not dispute, had the child said these things? This question hints at concern that the evidence 
may have been sufficient to support a conclusion that a finding of abuse had not been made 
out, but that the judge may have been on less solid ground in holding positively that there had 
been no abuse.    
    A comment of Hale L.J., however, may indicate that the Court of Appeal did not have that 
distinction in mind when considering the ongoing significance of the mother’s beliefs. Her 
ladyship observed: 
  
“It was, of course, for the judge to draw his conclusions as to the facts, and, again, on 
the material before us, he was certainly entitled to reach the conclusion that he did. 
Whether this is expressed as being satisfied that no abuse took place or not satisfied 
that it had taken place makes no difference as far as the law is concerned; they both 
amount to a finding that there has been no abuse.”89 
 
With respect, as discussed earlier, there is a difference between the inability to find a fact, 
and a positive (or negative) finding that something has actually not happened. It does not 
therefore make no difference as far as the law is concerned as Hale L.J. contends. A finding 
that something has not happened is to find that the content of the allegation that it happened 
is also false. If that conclusion is reached after considering all of the evidence, including any 
statements alleging or suggesting abuse, the court has no room for future reliance on such 
statements to found a parent’s belief in any risk to the child from the other parent. By 
contrast, if a judge has simply found that the evidence does not support a finding of abuse on 
the balance of probabilities, that does not mean that the allegations are false; it just means 
that the evidence was not sufficient to prove the case. It is submitted that in such a case it 
should be open to a judge to continue to rely, for example, on a child’s statements as a factual 
foundation for the mother’s belief that the child has been abused (if the fact that the 
statements were made is proved or admitted), although even that conclusion does not sit 
easily with the dictum from Allen v Allen cited earlier.   However, it is surely not possible for 
the court to do so in a case like Re A, when the parent has been exonerated of any abuse by 
the court.   
    Yet part of the reasoning that led Hale L.J. to put in place a supervised contact order was 
that “it must be of concern that a child who at the time was not yet five was saying these 
things, whether for the reasons given by the judge to do with the somewhat unusual and 
isolated nature of her family life and the atmosphere for whatever reason in the home, or 
whether for some other reason.” The first instance judge was clear, however, in his finding 
that the reason was not that the girl had been abused by her father, so it must surely also be a 
matter of concern, and surprise, that the Court of Appeal persisted in linking the child’s 
statements to the need for supervised contact with the father. It is instructive to consider the 
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courts’ likely approach if the finding and belief were reversed, that is, a father has been found 
to have sexually abused his child, but the mother does not believe that he has, because the 
child has said that he has not and she trusts the father. It seems unlikely that a court would 
acknowledge the mother’s beliefs as a justification for not putting in place supervised 
contact.   
    It will be recalled that Hale L.J. also commented that this “is a situation in which it is 
entirely possible for both parties to be right, in the sense that the father did not behave 
inappropriately with his daughter but the mother retains a real belief that he did based on 
what her daughter has said.” To say that it is possible for each parent to be right in particular 
senses, is to distract from the central issue which is whether, in light of the judge’s finding of 
fact, there could be legitimate continued reliance by the mother on a belief which was 
contrary to that finding. While the mother may have difficulty accepting the court’s finding, 
there is no reason why the appellate court should not accept the consequences of its own 
upholding of the judge’s finding. There seems little point in making a finding of fact if the 
court is to ignore it and permit the mother’s contrary belief to hold sway in any event. It 
might be said that there can then be a weighing up of the facts as found and the fact that the 
mother refuses to accept the court’s finding. However, the mother’s refusal to accept the 
court’s finding is irrelevant to whether the father represents a risk of harm to the child and, as 
argued above, the mother’s attitude, in so far as it represents a risk if contact be ordered, has 
no factual foundation given the court’s finding. 
    The question is not, therefore, whether the mother refuses to accept the court’s finding and 
retains a real belief, but whether in light of the court’s finding the court should in principle 
take account of that erroneous belief in its disposal. Case law suggests that a party’s belief 
should be extinguished prospectively upon a court’s finding of fact to the contrary. To persist 
in recognition of the belief in such circumstances would be for the law to accept wilful 
blindness to the facts as found by the court, or alternatively must suggest that the parent 
holding that mistaken view is genuinely delusional, for example because of a psychiatric 
illness. Those conclusions in any event raise other issues as to the child’s welfare, such as 
whether it is truly in the welfare of children to be brought up by a parent whose beliefs are 
delusional or dictated by wilful blindness to the facts.   
    To be clear, the criticism of Re A is not that the court put in place a temporary regime of 
supervised contact; there were some valid reasons for doing so irrespective of the court’s 
finding of fact on the sexual abuse issue, in order to smooth the rehabilitation of the 
father/child relationship. The criticism is with those parts of the reasoning which might 
suggest that the mother’s belief and what the child had said, continued to have some validity 
in respect of the propriety of the father’s unsupervised contact with the child. It is submitted 
that the court should have avoided saying that the mother could still be “right”, in the face of 
the court’s finding of fact, and that in these proceedings in relation to the father’s contact  it 
was still a matter of concern that the girl had said what she said. 
    A danger of accepting a mere belief in the face of a contrary factual finding was 
highlighted, at the level of policy, in a different context by the House of Lords in Williams v 
Beesley.90 In that case the plaintiff, who was suing a solicitor, wished a jury trial rather than 
before a single judge as he believed that the legal profession would be biased against him and 
towards the solicitor. The House of Lords commented that to “allow the court’s decision…to 
be swayed by the existence of such a belief by one of the parties, however sincerely it might 
be held, would be to acknowledge that there was some substance in it and that our system of 
justice lacks the firm foundation of an impartial judiciary.”91 In the child law context it is a 
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reminder that if a court is minded to deny or restrict contact in circumstances where the 
applicant for contact has been found not to be a risk of harm to the child, any disposal by the 
court should be framed in such a way as to make that clear and not create any other 
impression that there is any substance in the allegations that have been made against the 
applicant.   
 
3.  Hostility which is factually underpinned but not justified 
 
Once the risk from a parent’s hostility to contact has been proved to exist by reference to 
facts proved on the balance of probabilities, the court’s next task is “to carry out an 
evaluation of whether the primary carer’s rooted opposition is with or without objective 
foundation”,92 that is whether it is rationally connected or not to the other parent’s suitability 
to have contact. Where there is an objective foundation, the court’s job is “to balance the 
justified objection against all other considerations relevant to the performance of its duties 
under s 1 of the Children Act 1989” and only if the balance tips in favour of contact will an 
order be made.  
    In cases of unjustified implacable hostility to contact, including those in which resistance 
to contact is manifested through one parent alienating the other parent from the child,93 
judges tend only to “capitulate” to the hostility when it is clear that pursuing contact will do 
more harm than good. In testing whether that stage is reached, the courts have sometimes 
adopted a robust stance, employing enforcement strategies such as a change of the child’s 
residence or a threat thereof,94 or in extreme cases the making of an interim care order.95  
Parental alienation has been perceived as harmful to the child (as illustrated in the quotation 
from the judgment of McFarlane L.J. in Re J at the beginning of this article), and 
practitioners have called for the swift use of legal and, where appropriate, therapeutic 
interventions,96 although the difficulties such cases present can never be underestimated. 
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Eventually, despite all efforts, it may be necessary in the child’s interests to acknowledge the 
harm hostility would cause if contact were ordered. 
    It is interesting to note, however, that this is not how the Court of Appeal has characterised 
this end point. In Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions)97 Sir Thomas Bingham M.R., 
when discussing implacable hostility, talks of judging whether contact will injure a child, and 
Hale J. in Re D (Contact: Reasons for Refusal),98  similarly refers to reaching  “the 
conclusion that contact will be harmful to the child” (emphasis added). This raises a subtle 
but important point about how cases involving implacably hostile parents are characterised or 
described by the courts. Should the harm to the child be characterised as resulting from the 
non-resident parent’s contact, or from the resident parent’s hostility?   
    An emphasis on the harmfulness of the non-resident parent’s contact immediately raises 
the question of the relevance to contact proceedings of the resident parent’s unfounded 
hostility. On a contact application the court is not determining the child’s welfare at large.  Its 
focus is on whether the non-resident parent’s application for contact should be granted having 
regard to the welfare of the child.  By  s. 1(2A) of the Children Act 198999 a parent’s 
involvement in the child’s life will be presumed to further the child’s welfare, unless the 
contrary is shown.100 In a case of unfounded hostility to contact, the problem of relevance of 
the hostility to the parent’s application for contact lies in the fact that there is no link between 
the applicant parent and the harm to the child that is being claimed as a justification for 
denying contact. The harm is not a product of the nature or quality of the potential contact, 
nor has the applicant parent any justifiable causative role in the resident parent’s attitude to 
contact and its impact upon the child. It is clear in such cases that, but for the resident 
parent’s unjustifiable attitude, contact could proceed without harm to the child.  The cause of 
harm to the child is the knock-on effect of the resident parent’s hostility. It has not therefore 
in such cases been shown to the contrary that the non-resident parent’s involvement will not 
further the child’s welfare. That parent’s involvement will further the child’s welfare, but the 
resident parent’s unrelated and unjustified attitude to the same will result in harm. 
    It is submitted therefore that the courts should not countenance the emotional impact upon  
children of unjustified parental attitudes as a justification for denying another parent contact  
on the basis that the contact will be harmful. There should be no room in a case of unjustified 
hostility to contact for a resident parent to claim that the court decided that the non-resident 
parent’s contact with the child would be harmful. No one would ever claim that a resident 
parent’s hostility to contact manifested through alienation of a child should result in the 
characterisation of the other parent’s contact as harmful. Yet the resultant unjustified 
impedance of contact is the same irrespective of whether it is manifested through the parent’s 
direct objections or indirectly via the inauthentic views of the alienated child; and such 
parental behaviour may be similarly worrying. Indeed, in Re H (a child) (contact: mother’s 
opposition)101 Thorpe L.J., with whom Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P. agreed, commented 
that where a rooted opposition is without objective foundation, “it may well be indicative of a 
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disordered personality or at least disordered emotions leading to disordered thinking”102 and 
that it might “be dangerous to assume that such disordered states manifest themselves only in 
relation to the father and to contact. There may well be other areas of parental care and 
responsibility which are equally affected.”103 The Court of Appeal suggested that, in the same 
way as a non-resident parent with a propensity to violence might be ordered to seek 
treatment, a court should consider adopting the same approach where the disordered 
behaviour lies in the resident parent.104 Clearly this case  supports the view that in such cases 
harm is attributable to the parent who is resisting contact. 
    It is submitted that unjustified hostility to contact, however manifested, should never be 
permitted to result in characterisation of a non-resident parent’s contact as harmful, and 
should never be perceived in that sense as a justification for denying that parent contact. The 
courts should be clear about what is happening in such cases: contact which would otherwise 
be of benefit to the child’s welfare cannot take place because if it does the resident parent’s 
unjustified attitude will result in harm to the child. The only circumstances in which that state 
of affairs should be declared by a court is when that harm outweighs the benefit of contact; 
no alternative care arrangements are possible as a means of ensuring contact free from harm; 
and when all efforts for promoting contact consistent with the child’s welfare have been 
exhausted. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
A resident parent’s hostility to a child’s contact with the non-resident parent post-separation 
arises in broadly three categories of case: (1) where there is a risk of harm to the child 
independent of the hostility; (2) where there is no independent risk of harm but a genuine and 
justifiable fear of contact; and (3) in cases of unfounded hostility, in which there is no good 
reason for the hostility, whether by reason of a completely baseless objection, an irrational 
conclusion based on fact, or a genuine and rational concern based upon a factual error. 
English law permits unfounded hostility to thwart the child’s contact with the non-resident 
parent only when the resident parent’s attitude would place the child at serious risk of major 
emotional harm if contact were ordered.  In all categories of case, fact-finding is a crucial 
component of justice to ensure that a parent is not erroneously labelled as harmful in cases of 
unjustifiable hostility, and that a parent who has justifiable fears is not erroneously labelled as 
unjustifiably hostile. It is also an essential foundation for accurate identification of where the 
child’s welfare lies. 
    All children cases are subject to the rule that any inference as to risk of harm to a child 
must be founded upon facts proved on the balance of probabilities (the rule in Re M and R).  
However, while this is a principle familiar to family court judges, it may be that they are less 
attuned to applying it in respect of the risk of emotional harm to children from parental 
beliefs/attitudes. Certainly, the Court of Appeal’s engagement with this issue to date has been 
sketchy, lacks clarity and is arguably contradictory.   
    This article has sought to highlight that the rule in Re M and R applies to any parental 
belief or attitude which is said to risk harm to child. In cases of ‘unfounded hostility’ to 
contact, identifying facts which underpin the existence of the parent’s attitude and 
demonstrate a serious risk of major emotional harm if contact be ordered, may be no easy 
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task, particularly at the court’s initial stage of deciding whether in principle contact should be 
ordered. While there is no requirement that the attitude or belief be reasonable or rational, its 
reasonableness or otherwise in the circumstances of the case is a matter of evidence going to 
whether it is actually held. Where the attitude/belief is irrational and baseless a court might 
well be entitled to conclude that the genuineness (actuality) of the attitude/belief is open to 
doubt. In cases of unfounded hostility, courts should clearly articulate the facts on which they 
draw the conclusion that a parent’s attitude places the child at serious risk of major emotional 
harm. If there is no factual foundation for such attitude, there can be no inference of such risk 
to the child’s welfare therefrom.   
    Cases which are likely to require a particularly careful analysis of whether the Re M and R 
rule is fulfilled are those in which parental belief conflicts with the court’s findings of fact. 
Analysis of case law suggests that a principle of general application is that, at least 
prospectively, the court’s finding of fact must prevail over erroneous beliefs which contradict 
that finding. It follows that, in a case in which a court has made a positive finding that a child 
has not been abused by a parent, there is no scope for the factual foundation of a parent’s 
belief to the contrary. On the other hand, if the court’s finding is merely that the abuse has 
not been proved, allegations of abuse have not been completely extinguished by the court’s 
finding of fact, and there may still be scope to found such belief upon statements or 
allegations which have been proved.  
    In cases in which hostility has a factual foundation but is unjustified, in the sense of having 
no relevant connection to the non-resident parent’s suitability to have contact, without more it 
cannot be shown, within the meaning of s. 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989, that the non-
resident parent’s involvement will not further the child’s welfare. Accordingly, in such cases 
the courts should only deny contact as a last resort, and never describe the non-resident 
parent’s contact as ‘harmful’. Rather, they should be clear about what is happening: contact 
which would otherwise be of benefit to the child’s welfare cannot take place because, if it 
does, the resident parent’s unjustified attitude will result in harm to the child. 
 
 
 
 
 
